The Israel-Hamas war's regional domino effect

The role of regional powerhouses like Türkiye, Russia, and Iran has become increasingly prominent in the turbulent landscape of the Israel-Hamas war. How are they involved in the ongoing war and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at large?

15 October 2023. Written by Aren Melikyan, Ata Ahmet Kökçü, and Viktorya Muradyan. Edited by Julius E. O. Fintelmann and Sofiya Tryzub-Cook.

Türkiye

Türkiye was one of the first countries to recognise the State of Israel in 1949. Since then, Ankara has built a relationship with Arab countries and Israel. From the 1990s, the prospect of a peace agreement allowed Türkiye to develop warmer ties with Israel. Both countries even inked an intelligence-sharing deal between Türkiye’s MIT and Israel’s Mossad in 1997, which was reportedly severed in 2010 and restored in 2022. In recent years, Türkiye has assumed a mediating role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, significantly departing from its more balanced stance before the Arab Spring. This shift, however, has brought forth a range of complexities.

President Erdoğan's long-standing association with Hamas, especially since his Justice and Development Party’s election victory in 2006, began straining relations between Türkiye and Israel. His portrayal as a ‘leader of Muslim countries’ granted him substantial influence in domestic politics, positioning him as a vocal advocate for the ‘Palestinian cause’, manifesting his sphere of influence within Muslim societies until today.

In 2010, relations fundamentally changed after the Israeli navy boarded Mavi Marmara, the Turkish flagship of a pro-Palestinian aid fleet. A decade later, Türkiye tried to mend diplomatic rifts by entering a normalisation process with Israel while maintaining its relationship with Hamas. Political pressures from Washington, Tehran, and Hezbollah compelled Türkiye to distance itself from the group, whose leaders, according to reports, moved to Türkiye after the Syrian Civil War. In the summer of 2022, Israel and Türkiye announced the full normalisation of diplomatic ties.

Today, despite Türkiye's shift to a mediating role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its influence in the region has slightly diminished. Erdoğan emphasised the need to follow ethical principles in warfare, opposing civilian casualties in both Israel and Gaza and condemned Israel's restriction of humanitarian aid to Gaza. After Hamas’ attack on 7 October, Erdoğan met and held negotiations with the group’s political associates in Türkiye to solve the hostage crisis.

Looking ahead, Türkiye faces significant challenges in normalising relations with Israel. On the one hand, there are strong anti-Arab sentiments fuelled by the influx of refugees, mostly from Syria and Afghanistan, opposing Türkiye’s involvement with the Israel-Palestine conflict, especially in support of the latter. On the other hand, a substantial group of Erdoğan’s religious voters anticipate a hawkish anti-Israel stance.

Iran

According to Israel, Iran funds Hamas to the tune of $100 million annually. The US State Department stated in 2021 that the group receives funding, weapons, and training from Iran, as well as some funds raised in Gulf Arab countries. Hamas’ actions benefit Iran by enhancing Hamas’ position in Palestine and increasing Iran's position in its ongoing shadow war with Israel. Iran's geopolitical standing is changing due to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Tehran's role in supplying drones to Moscow, as well as a deal for Saudi-Iran relations brokered by China, have strengthened Iran's diplomatic position too.

In recent years, the Middle East has witnessed events suggesting covert operations and tensions involving Israel and Iran. These include airstrikes in Syria targeting Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps assets, cyberattacks against Iranian infrastructure, sabotages, assassinations, and more.

The Israel-Hamas war has put many Gulf Arab countries in the region in difficulty, as they sought normalisation with Israel. The US, which had worked on these normalisations, suddenly found itself in danger of collapsing the partnerships it had worked and built for years. Feeling even more encircled, Iran has a strategic interest in disrupting normalisation steps between Arab and Middle Eastern countries and Israel.

In the ongoing power struggle within the region, Türkiye and Iran find themselves at odds, particularly in the Syrian conflict. Ankara is determined to unseat President Bashar al-Assad, while Tehran staunchly backs Russia in support of Assad. Furthermore, Iran expresses deep apprehension regarding Türkiye's sustained military presence in Iraq and Syria, where various Iran-aligned groups operate. Iran perceives Türkiye's military involvement as a significant obstacle to its aspirations for expanding regional dominance.

In the past, Türkiye has engaged in conflicts with proxy groups backed by Iran, both in Syria and Iraq. This ongoing rivalry between Türkiye and Iran reflects the intricate dynamics of regional politics. Furthermore, the dire relations between Azerbaijan and Iran play a pivotal role in shaping Türkiye's stance towards Iran. It is crucial to note that Türkiye, a NATO member with NATO assets on its territory, poses a notable concern for Iran.

Türkiye's efforts to normalise relations with Gulf countries also present a contentious issue for Iran. Steps to normalise ties between Türkiye and Israel are also viewed negatively by Iran, but this does not prevent Erdoğan from communicating with either his Iranian or Israeli counterparts.

Russia

The Kremlin has managed a relatively balanced foreign policy with Israel and Palestine. On one hand, Russia has a significant Jewish population, which was an important factor for friendly relations with Israel. On the other hand, Moscow's ties with Palestinian authorities and Hamas date back to the Cold War years, when Russia was supporting Palestinian forces militarily, economically and politically due to Soviet anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism.

The relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv started souring rapidly after Russia invaded Ukraine. Firstly, Russia's isolation from the global markets and its traditional allies pushed Putin to develop tight ties with Iran, particularly in the sector of defence industries. Secondly, Putin's narrative of “fighting neo-Nazism” in Ukraine has upset the Jewish community. In response, Israel has expressed solidarity with Kyiv but refused to impose sanctions on Moscow or provide weapons to Ukraine.

The passive response of the Kremlin to Hamas's brutal attack on Israel is thus symptomatic of this changing dynamic between the three countries. Following the attack, Moscow went silent for a few days, then blamed the war on the failure of American policies in the Middle East and refused to list Hamas as a terrorist organisation. While the Kremlin's loyalties are not with Hamas, neither are they with Israel, which can be seen as a big betrayal.

Currently, there aren’t any signs of Russia being the driver behind the Hamas attack. However, Ukraine’s military intelligence claims that Russia has transferred Western-made weapons captured in Ukraine to Hamas.

Moscow still can be one of the biggest winners of this escalation. As many experts were speculating or advocating for a second front against Russia being opened in the South Caucasus, a second front indeed opened but in the Middle East and to the detriment of Ukraine and the West. Firstly, if the Israel-Hamas war stretches into a long-term military operation, the US and the EU will have to not only keep the fragile unity but also be very strategic about their military support to Ukraine. Secondly, Russia’s newfound close defence ally Iran might start sending the receipts of their support to the Kremlin, to be paid in the form of military equipment and weapons. Finally, considering that the Kremlin is “maintaining contacts with both sides in the conflict", Russia might also step up as a ‘mediator’ to support the ‘resolution of the conflict’.

The spillover effect: dangers and challenges in the South Caucasus

The three South Caucasus countries have been busy with their own conflicts and drowned in their geopolitical ambitions, continuously trying to distance themselves from the Middle East. However, the consequences of ongoing shifts next door might challenge their evasion, as the region is undergoing major geopolitical transitions.

The latest Israel-Hamas war unfolded less than three weeks after Azerbaijan undertook a military operation, taking complete control of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region and forcing over 100,000 ethnic Armenians out of there. A dramatic turnover that would not be possible without Israel’s advanced military contribution, an act that many in Armenia believe Israel did its bit in.

In recent years, Israel has been taking sides more clearly in the South Caucasus. A sworn enemy of Iran, Israel seeks more cooperation at Iran’s northern gates and found its ally in Azerbaijan. The close partnership between the two only grew over the last decade. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute five years, from 2017 to 2021, over 60% of Azerbaijani arms were provided by Israel. Beyond arms trades, Azerbaijan’s “pay off” for this cooperation also reportedly includes Israeli intelligence at Azerbaijan's southern border with Iran.

This keenship is bitter to follow for Iran, however. The tension between Baku and Tehran peaked after a violent attack on the Azerbaijani embassy in Iran in January this year. Amid the tension, Azerbaijan opened its embassy in Israel.

The denouncement of Tehran from Baku comes at a time when Iran attempts to hinder Azerbaijan’s ambitions to claim an extraterritorial corridor from Armenia. Having the greenlight of Moscow, this extraterritorial “corridor” would also cut off Armenia’s border with Iran. Under cover of doubts over a possible Armenian-Azerbaijani peace agreement, the US reportedly has warned about an imminent invasion in the coming weeks.

At a time when Israel, one of Azerbaijan’s leading arms suppliers, is busy fighting its own war, it might also impact Azerbaijan’s possible plans for a new escalation. Nevertheless, while the world shifted its focus towards the Middle East, this could also be a moment for Russia and Azerbaijan to launch new offensives in Ukraine and Armenia, respectively.

Despite the tangle beyond the scene, the countries were more reluctant to take sides in public. On the day of the Hamas attack on Israel, the foreign diplomatic missions of all three countries expressed their concern. And while Armenia and Azerbaijan were more balanced in their approach, joining international calls to end the violence, Georgia did not hesitate to offer their solidarity to Israel.

In a recent visit to Tbilisi, the head of the Israeli Knesset (parliament), in a briefing with his Georgian counterparts, stressed “the need to work together” against Iran. This announcement surprised some in the country and beyond, leaving many with the question about the chances that Georgia might reconsider its friendly relations with Iran, a move not foreseeable at the moment.

As the geopolitical giants and dwarfs race for influence and manoeuvre their alliances, the region's security and resilience are tested while the Middle East and Eastern Europe face a shifting landscape. The most crucial variable in the equation is time: the longer the Israel-Hamas war continues, the more difficult it will be for countries like Russia and Türkiye to keep the fragile neutrality and the more chances there will be for military escalations between other countries in the region. And as always, civilians caught in the middle will continue to suffer.